Introduction
In the standard criminal court procedure, minor children have not been given primary consideration during the sentencing process of the primary caregiver by criminal courts. Until recently, the sentencing process followed in South Africa only considered the interests of children as a circumstance or mitigating factor that the offender could utilise during the sentencing process. A change has come about because of the special protection provided to children by Section 28 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, in recognition of their vulnerability in society. 1 Section 28(1) affords various rights to children, and Section 28(1)(b) in particular states that every child has the right to family care or parental care or to appropriate alternative care when removed from the family environment. Section 28(2) 2 indicates that the child's best interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child. 3 The questions posed in the article are: What does the change that was brought about when the sentencing court considered Section 28(1)(b) and 28(2) involve when sentencing the primary caregiver of minor children?
Will the application of these sections to the sentencing process result in a therapeutic outcome for all the parties affected by this wrongful incident? In Minister for Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick 2000 3 SA 422 (CC) para 17, the court stated that S 28(2) creates a specific right independent of the rights provided for in S 28(1). 3 See 3.1.
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The therapeutic jurisprudence approach is new to the realm of South African law. 4 The website of the International Network on Therapeutic Jurisprudence explains the concept as follows:
Therapeutic jurisprudence concentrates on the law's impact on emotional life and psychological wellbeing. It is a perspective that regards the law (rules of law, legal procedures, and roles of legal actors) itself as a social force that often produces therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences. It does not suggest that therapeutic concerns are more important than other consequences or factors, but it does suggest that the law's role as a potential therapeutic agent should be recognized and systematically studied.
5
Therapeutic jurisprudence focuses our attention on the human, emotional and psychological side of law and the legal process. 6 Wexler 7 explains that, from a therapeutic jurisprudence viewpoint, the law itself can be a potential therapeutic agent in that legal rules, procedures and the behaviour of legal actors may produce therapeutic or anti-therapeutic results. The concept suggests that anti-therapeutic consequences of the law are bad, while therapeutic consequences of the law are good. 8 Therapeutic jurisprudence wants us to be aware of this and wants us to see whether we can make or apply the law in a more therapeutic way. 9 It is concerned with the improvement of the law and the operation thereof by searching for ways of minimising negative and promoting positive effects on the well-being of those affected by the law.
10
Goldberg 11 is of the opinion that the criminal sentencing process (as a legal procedure) can be a therapeutic opportunity. According to Rautenbach, 12 the application of therapeutic jurisprudence during the court process can have the effect that law as a punitive agent changes to law as a healing agent. Du Plessis and 4 In South Africa, the only literature that has explored the feasibility thereof in relation to the South African framework suggests that the therapeutic jurisprudence approach is applied in cases of domestic violence (Du Plessis and Sinclair 2007 Stell LR 91-117) and customary courts (Rautenbach 2005 SAJHR 323-335 
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Sinclair 13 emphasise that a therapeutic jurisprudence approach requires the legal processes following a crime or contravention of the law, for example sentencing, to be developed and conducted in such a manner that all the individuals involved in a particular incident or repetitive wrongful incidents must be considered and protected.
The terms of a sentence can also provide an offender with the means to confront their transgression and to start a process of change. 14 Therefore, from a therapeutic perspective, when considering Section 28(1)(b) and 28(2) as part of the sentencing process, the process should be developed so as to protect all the individuals affected by the crime. In the article, case law is discussed in order to determine the impact that the inclusion of the human rights of the child had on the sentencing process. It will then be determined whether this inclusion might improve therapeutic outcomes without the apprehension that the interests of justice will be forfeited.
15
The sentencing framework used in South Africa
The basic principles of sentencing in South Africa are based on the dictum of Rumpff JA in the decision S v Zinn, 16 which stated that "[w]hat has to be considered is the triad consisting of the crime, the offender and the interests of society". 17 An appropriate sentence should therefore reflect the severity of the crime, consider all the mitigating and aggravating factors surrounding the person of the offender and serve the interests of society. 18 In S v Kibido, 19 Olivier JA stated that:
Now, it is trite law that the determination of a sentence in a criminal matter is pre-eminently a matter for the discretion of the trial court. In the exercise of this function the trial court has a wide discretion in (a) deciding which factors should be allowed to influence the court in determining the measure of punishment and (b) in determining the value to attach to each H factor taken into account ... . Even though the court has this discretion, Friedman J 20 states that when determining sentence, the court should "arrive at a judicious counterbalance between these elements in order to ensure that one element is not unduly accentuated at the expense of and to the exclusion of the others". If the court fails to take certain factors into account or attaches the wrong value to these factors, it will amount to a misdirection "but only when the dictates of justice carry clear conviction that an error has been committed in this regard". 21
The second leg of the triad
This segment revolves around the criminal and is often referred to as "individualisation". 22 Many mitigating factors are taken into account when the offender is considered and prior to S v M 23 one of the factors considered by the court included the interests of children. In S v Shangase, 24 it was found that one of the potentially relevant factors the court would regard as mitigating the severity of desirable punishment was whether the accused was in regular employment and had dependants. However, economic circumstances will only become significant if measured against other factors, and these factors may only have an influence on the outcome of the sentence if a non-custodial sentence is contemplated.
25
The punitive aspect of the sentence was increased in a case in which the offender had a family who was dependent upon the offender, since the dependants would have been left without the care of that person if the offender received a sentence of imprisonment. 26 This was the situation in S v Benetti. 27 The appellant had been convicted of seven counts of theft and was sentenced to three years' imprisonment.
Some of the factors that the court considered with regard to the sentence were that she had two previous convictions of theft, had two minor children, earned R328 per month after tax and her husband earned R500 per month after tax. 28 An appeal was brought against the sentence on the basis that it was too severe.
Hiemstra J 29 concluded that the community would benefit more by keeping the family of the accused intact and preserving her productivity. The overriding factor was that the interests of society were better served by her repaying the stolen amount. 30 The judge suspended the three years' imprisonment for three years on condition that the accused did not again commit any offence of dishonesty during the period of suspension and repaid at least R200 per month to the SA Permanent Building Society, from which she stole the money. 31 In his judgment, Hiemstra J 32 made the following statement:
We wish to adopt a more enlightened approach in which the probable effect of incarceration upon the life of the accused person and those near to her is carefully weighed.
Until recently, the interests of children were only considered as a mitigating factor of the offender during the sentencing process and not as an independent factor apart from the Zinn triad. The consideration of dependants during the sentencing process became significant as a result of the inclusion of children's rights in the Constitution.
Section 28 of the Constitution
The Child Care Act 33 did not recognise the worldwide rights of children under international law and did not make provision for future challenges, such as the phenomenon of street children, unaccompanied foreign children, or the difficulties that HIV/Aids would pose for the community. 34 The ideal opportunity to adequately recognise the rights of children was provided by the drafting of a new constitution for South Africa and the ratification of international instruments, such as the United constitutional rights are mutually interrelated and interdependent and form a single constitutional value system. This Court has held that s 28(2), like the other rights enshrined in the Bill of Rights, is subject to limitations that are reasonable and justifiable in compliance with s 36.
According to Sachs J, 49 the standard to be applied when undertaking the limitations analysis is the nuanced and contextual one required by Section 36.
In Christian Education South Africa, it was contended that Section 10 of the South African Schools Act, 50 which prohibits corporal punishment in schools, infringed the rights of the parents of children at independent schools who, in accordance with their religious convictions, had consented to corporal punishment. The respondent argued that the infliction of corporal punishment infringed, inter alia, Section 28 of the Constitution. 51 In reaching his judgment, Sachs J weighed the parents' rights to freedom of belief 52 and practice of religion 53 against Section 28 to determine which right should be limited. Section 28(2) was not automatically preferred above the other rights in the Constitution. It was concluded that it was reasonable to limit the rights of the parents in order to protect the rights of the children.
Section 28(1)(b) of the Constitution
As indicated above, Section 28(1) affords various rights to children. For the purpose of the article, only Section 28(1)(b) is relevant and will henceforth be discussed. The first part of Section 28(1)(b) states that every child has the right to family care or parental care.
The legislature deemed it fit to distinguish between "family care" and "parental care".
On numerous occasions, the courts explained the purpose of this distinction. It is 49 Christian Education South Africa para 31. 50 84 of 1996, S 10 states: "Prohibition of corporal punishment (1) No person may administer corporal punishment at a school to a learner. (2) Any person who contravenes S (1) is guilty of an offence and liable on conviction to a sentence which could be imposed for assault." 51 Christian Education South Africa para 2. 52 S 15(1) of the Constitution states that: "everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religion, thought, belief and opinion". 53 S 31(1) of the Constitution states that: "Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be denied the right, with other members of that community -(a) to enjoy their culture, practice their religion and use their language …".
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64
The second purpose of this section is that care of a certain quality be given to all children. 65 Lastly, the section indicates the parties that must furnish such care. Children can also be placed in the statutory foster-care system accompanied by the payment of a grant to the foster parent.
Bannatyne v Bannatyne
70
Children have the right to be cared for by their parents or extended family. The state must ensure that legislation is in place to oblige the caregiver(s) to fulfil this role and to create the setting to enable the parent(s) to do so. Another obligation is the preservation of existing family structures. Appropriate alternative care must be provided by the state in the absence of family or parental care. Furthermore, the state must refrain from any action that can infringe upon the rights of the children. It is clear that the state has a mammoth responsibility in terms of Section 28.
Since the state is obliged to respect and protect the rights of children, sentencing courts must consider Sections 28(2) and 28 (1) 
The Kika case
This matter came before the high court on automatic review. According to Cloete J, with whom Hussain J concurred, the magistrate ignored a statement made in mitigation of sentence that the accused had two children, was the sole breadwinner and that there would be no one to look after the children were she to be sent to prison. 74 Cloete J further alleged that the magistrate acted irresponsibly when passing a sentence that could result in the accused being imprisoned, without considering any steps with regard to the welfare of the children. 75 The interests of the children as protected by the Constitution were not taken into account. The judge felt it appropriate to refer to Section 28(1)(b) in this context. 76 He requested one of the deputy attorneys-general to enquire about the children of the accused. The police visited the home of the accused and, according to the grandfather of the children, the children were being looked after by a friend of the accused who was unemployed and unable to support them, as was the grandfather. 77 The court ordered, inter alia, that the matter be referred to the magistrate for the purposes of sentence, and further that:
If the sentence imposed will result in the imprisonment of the accused, the magistrate is directed to conduct an enquiry with a view to determining whether an order in terms of s 11 of the Child Care Act 78 should be made or otherwise to satisfy himself that proper provision is made for the welfare of the children of the accused.
79
Cloete J had regard to the second part of Section 28(1)(b), which obliges the state to ensure that children will receive appropriate care in instances in which parental care is lacking. This would, for instance, be the case were the primary caregiver to be sent to prison. Cloete J instructed the magistrate to ensure that the children would be properly cared for were the appropriate sentence to be direct imprisonment.
4.2
The Howells case
The appellant in this case, who was 36 years of age and had three minor sons at the time of the hearing, was convicted of fraud committed over a period of two years. 
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The judge applied Section 28(2) and 28(1)(b) to the sentencing process in order to determine whether the sentence of imprisonment imposed by the magistrate was to remain as it was. It was however determined that, given the seriousness of the crime, the interests of society outweighed the interests of the children. Yet, the second part of Section 28(1)(b) still required that the state in these circumstances guarantee the well-being of the children, and the judge therefore gave instructions to this effect to the Department of Welfare and Population Development. The court ensured that the children would be cared for during the time that the primary caregiver would be imprisoned. They would also have contact with their mother and the family would be provided with further assistance following her release from prison.
4.3
The M case
Background
In order to protect the identity of the children concerned, the Constitutional Court ordered that the applicant's name be kept anonymous and that she be referred to as "M". M was a 35-year-old divorced mother and had three minor boys aged approximately 8, 12 and 16 years, respectively, at the time of the hearing. On 24
February 1996, M was convicted on one count of fraud and sentenced to a fine and a suspended sentence. In June 1999, she was again charged with fraud and whilst out on bail, after having been in prison for a short period, she committed further fraud offences.
In 2002, the applicant was convicted on 38 counts of fraud and four counts of theft and was sentenced to four years' direct imprisonment. The Cape High Court granted leave to appeal against the sentence and allowed her to be released on bail. The high court held that she had been wrongfully convicted on a count of fraud involving an amount of R10 000, leaving the quantum of the remaining counts at R19 158,69.
Subsequently, the sentence was converted to one of imprisonment under Section 276(1)(i) of the Criminal Procedure Act, which meant that, after serving eight months' imprisonment, the commissioner for correctional services could authorise her release under correctional supervision. M petitioned the Supreme Court of Appeal for leave
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to appeal against the order of imprisonment. She based her application on the ground that the high court had failed to take into account the best interests of her children, which resulted in the imposition of a custodial sentence rather than correctional supervision. Her request was turned down and M proceeded to approach the Constitutional Court. That court enrolled her application for leave to appeal against the sentence. 
The majority judment
The majority judgment was delivered by Sachs J with whom six other judges concurred. According to Sachs J, the purpose of Section 28 is that the law must seek to avoid, if possible, any breakdown of family life or parental care that might threaten to place children at increased risk. 96 However, if this is inevitable, the state must minimise the consequent negative effect this will have on the children. 97 This statement is in accordance with Section 7(2), which obliges the state to protect the rights of the child. The core of his judgment with reference to the influence of Section 28(2) on the sentencing process involved the following:
Focused and informed attention needs to be given to the interest of children at appropriate moments in the sentencing process. The objective is to ensure that the sentencing court is in a position adequately to balance all the varied interests involved, including those of the children placed at risk. This should become a standard preoccupation of all sentencing courts. To the extent that the current practice of sentencing courts may fall short in this respect, proper regard for Constitutional requirements necessitates a degree of change in judicial mindset.
98
In order to ensure that future sentencing courts give the appropriate attention to the interests of children while deciding on an appropriate sentence, Sachs J 99 provided a list of guidelines to be followed by the sentencing courts during the sentencing process in cases in which the primary caregiver of children is involved:
(a) A sentencing court should find out whether a convicted person is a primary caregiver whenever there are indications that this might be so. (b) A probation officer's report is not needed to determine this in each case. The convicted person can be asked for the information and if the presiding officer has reason to doubt the answer, he or she can ask the convicted person to lead evidence to establish the fact. The prosecution should also contribute what information it can; its normal adversarial posture should be relaxed when the interests of children are involved. The court should ascertain the effect on the children of a custodial sentence if such a sentence is being considered. (c) If on the Zinn triad approach the appropriate sentence is clearly custodial and the convicted person is a primary caregiver, the court must apply its mind to whether it is necessary to take steps to ensure that the children will be adequately cared for while the caregiver is incarcerated. (d) If the appropriate sentence is clearly non-custodial, the court must determine the appropriate sentence, bearing in mind the interests of the children. (e) Finally, if there is a range of appropriate sentences on the Zinn approach, then the court must use the paramountcy principle concerning the interests of the child as an important guide in deciding which sentence to impose.
The importance of maintaining the integrity of family care on the one hand and the duty of the state to punish criminal misconduct on the other have to be weighed by the sentencing court. 100 The court will first use the Zinn triad to determine an appropriate sentence. If there is a range of sentences that can be imposed, of which one has to be non-custodial, the court has to weigh the rights of the child as an independent factor in determining the appropriate sentence. If this is not the case, and the primary caregiver is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, the approach requires that a sentencing court see to it that the child or children will be cared for during that period of incarceration. This was the case in Kika and Howells.
Sachs J used the Howells case as an example to demonstrate that there is scope for a balancing analysis involving Section 28 within the current sentencing framework.
101
It was his opinion that Howells differed from the approach of the sentencing courts in casu with regard to the character of the analysis. 102 Whereas in Howells the implications of Section 28 were expressly weighed, in casu they were barely touched 100 M case 560G-561A. 101 M case 563D. 102 M case 563E.
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The minority judgment
Madala J delivered a dissenting opinion, which was agreed to by two other judges.
Madala J stated from the onset that he agreed with the reasoning of Sachs J to the extent that it related to the best interests of the children in terms of Section 28(2).
109
He was however unable to support the approach followed by Sachs J, particularly on the assessment of the evidence for the purpose of determining an appropriate sentence and the sentence Sachs J proposed, and decided to set out his views separately.
110
Madala J 111 presented his opinion on the manner in which Section 28(2) should be applied by sentencing courts during the sentencing process as follows:
... courts sentencing primary caregivers are obliged to apply a child-centered approach and not to merely treat children as a circumstance of an accused. Such an approach would undoubtedly meet the Constitutional requirements necessitated by s 28(2) of the Constitution … where a primary caregiver's sentence is being considered, the sentencing officer must go beyond the Zinn-triad requirements. It would be proper, in deserving cases, to take into account the impact of imprisonment on the dependants. This, however, does not imply that the primary caregiver will always escape imprisonment so as to protect the rights and best interests of the minor children. There must be circumstances justifying an alternative before the sentencing officer may decide to reduce the otherwise appropriate sentence. Such circumstances should be considered cumulatively and an objective evaluation of all the relevant factors is required.
According to Madala J, 112 the factors that need to be considered include the ages and special needs of the minor children, the nature and character of the primary caregiver, the seriousness and prevalence of the offence committed and the degree of moral blameworthiness on the part of the offender. In the M case, the primary caregiver was a recidivist who continued to commit crimes of a similar nature even whilst out on bail and the children were relatively close to their teens. It would therefore be foolish and unnecessarily sentimental to impose a non-custodial
sentence. 113 Furthermore, whilst it must be borne in mind that the best interests of the child are of paramount importance, Section 28(2) is subject to limitations that are reasonable and justifiable in compliance with the provisions of Section 36(1).
114
As Sachs J did, Madala J held that the Constitutional Court should not interfere with the sentence imposed by the high court, unless a clear misdirection can be established. Madala J therefore concluded that, given the protracted history of the case, the interests of the applicant's children and the fact that the court had been furnished with the necessary information, the Constitutional Court was mandated to review the sentence of the high court in order to ascertain whether any misdirection had occurred.
115
Madala J considered the underlying principles in the Zinn triad. Only then did he consider the duties of sentencing courts in respect of the best interests of children.
He referred to a report filed by the Department of Social Development. According to the report, a number of relatives of the children involved in this case indicated that they were prepared to take care of the children's financial needs and to assist with their daily care, as they had done this the previous time that M had been in prison.
116
Once the best interests of the children had been considered, Madala J found that there was no justifiable reason to interfere with the sentence imposed by the high court. He was encouraged in his view by the report of the Department of Social Development, from which it was clear that the children were in fact not at risk of severe prejudice were their mother to be incarcerated. 117 He dismissed the appeal.
In conclusion, according to Sachs J, appropriate attention needs to be given to the interests of children during the sentencing process in order to balance all the relevant factors. In order to ensure that future sentencing courts have due regard for the interests of children, he compiled guidelines that need to be followed when the convicted person is a primary caregiver. The guidelines determine that an appropriate sentence must be determined by using the Zinn triad. If the appropriate sentence is clearly custodial, the court has the duty to ensure the well-being of the children as required by Section 28(1)(b). However, if more than one sentence seems to be appropriate, one of which is a non-custodial sentence, Section 28(2) must be weighed as an independent factor against all the other factors to determine an appropriate sentence. In casu, Sachs J, as a result of applying Section 28(2), replaced the sentence of imprisonment with a sentence of correctional supervision.
Madala J concurred with Sachs J regarding the application of Section 28(2) when a primary caregiver is sentenced. His judgment entailed that children should not be treated as a mere circumstance of the accused, but that the sentencing officer must go beyond the Zinn triad in order to meet the constitutional requirements. Madala J considered the principles in the Zinn triad, after which he considered the interests of the children with care. He concluded that the interests of the children were to be limited and that the sentence of imprisonment was to stand.
It will now be determined whether the inclusion of Section 28(1)(b) and 28(2) as part of the sentencing process might improve therapeutic outcomes. In order to do this, it is necessary to compare the standard criminal court procedure with a therapeutic court procedure.
5
What distinguishes a therapeutic result from a result that stems from a standard criminal court procedure?
5.1
The difference between a standard criminal court procedure and a therapeutic court procedure According to Goldberg, 118 the standard court procedure is recognised by it being an adversarial process with the emphasis on adjudication. In order to reach a judgment and decide upon a sentence, the court will interpret and apply the law, consider the Zinn triad by looking at the crime, the circumstances of the offender and the influence the crime had on society. As a result of the M case, the court will also 118 Judging for the 21st Century 5.
consider Section 28(2) where applicable. After due consideration of all these factors, the court will come to a decision. Ultimately, this process will have a legal outcome.
A therapeutic court procedure takes the standard court procedure a step further.
Therapeutic jurisprudence requires of the court to apply the law in a more therapeutic manner. 119 It wishes to improve the operation of the law by searching for ways of minimising negative and promoting positive effects on the well-being of those affected by the law. 120 Even though therapeutic jurisprudence focuses primarily on individuals, the concept also considers the effect of the law on groups or society. 121 It does not mean that the therapeutic jurisprudence approach expects the judge to become a therapist. 122 In order to achieve a therapeutic outcome, the judge should be people-oriented as opposed to being case-oriented. 123 The purpose is to promote the well-being of all individuals and/or groups affected by the incident. magistrate was not even aware of the whereabouts of the children. This lack of attention prompted the judge to enquire immediately about the children to secure their well-being. He ordered that the magistrate, should the sentence of the primary caregiver be direct imprisonment, ensure that provision be made for care of the children as required by the second part of Section 28(1)(b). The application of the interests of the children to the sentencing process had the effect that even were the appropriate sentence to be direct imprisonment, there would be proper care for the children. The judge ensured that it would be the case with these children, thereby making the outcome of this case therapeutic. The well-being of the children was thus ensured.
The Howells case
In considering an appropriate sentence in the Howells case, Van Heerden AJ took Section 28(2) and 28(1)(b) under review. However, it turned out that the seriousness of the crime and the interests of society justified the sentence of imprisonment. The interests of the children were therefore limited. According to Sachs J, the approach followed in the Howells case is in accordance with the paramountcy principle, which only requires that the interests of the children who stand to be affected receive due consideration and which does not necessitate overriding all other considerations.
125
This being said, the state still had the responsibility in terms of Section 28(1)(b) to ensure that the children would be cared for during the time that the primary caregiver was incarcerated. As the father of the children was not a suitable person to care for the children, this implied that the children had to be taken into care. The judge requested the Department of Welfare and Population Development to investigate the circumstances of the three minor children. The department was further instructed to take all necessary steps to ensure that the children were properly cared for and that they remained in contact with their mother during the period of imprisonment. On her release from prison, the mother and her children had to be reunited and support had to be given to the family. Even though the mother was imprisoned, the children who were affected would be cared for during that time. The mother of the children would also benefit from knowing that the children would be cared for, that they would visit frequently and that the family would be supported after her release from prison.
These consequences were brought about by the application of Section 28(1)(b) to the sentencing process, and are therapeutic. All the parties affected by this wrongful incident benefit from the instructions given by Van Heerden AJ. When making the legal decision regarding sentencing, Section 28(2) was limited. However, the application of the second part of Section 28(1)(b) ensured that the carrying out of that decision was still therapeutic, bearing in mind the well-being of the children.
The M case
According to Sachs J, the purpose of Section 28 is that the law must seek to avoid any breakdown of family life or parental care. In his judgment, Sachs J considered the Zinn triad and more than one appropriate sentence revealed itself, of which one was non-custodial. He then applied his own guidelines regarding the application of Section 28(2) in order to determine an appropriate sentence. He reviewed the care of the children of the offender should she be imprisoned. Section 28(1)(b) bestows the right on the child to appropriate alternative care when removed from the family environment. It was indicated that some alternative family care could be arranged should the mother be sent to prison, but Sachs J was of the opinion that this arrangement was not appropriate and not in the best interests of the children.
Evidence indicated that M was in the best position to care for her children and that further imprisonment might be harmful to the children. The evidence prompted the judge to change the sentence of imprisonment to one of correctional supervision. As the court had to consider the rights of the offender's children during the sentencing process, this tipped the scale from a custodial to a non-custodial sentence. The result was that rights of the children were adhered to since they would be cared for by their mother.
However, it was not only the children who benefitted from this decision, but also other parties affected by the wrongful incident. In his judgment, Sachs J 126 indicated that:
in the light of all the circumstances of this case M, her children, the community and the victims who will be repaid from her earnings stand to benefit more from her being placed under correctional supervision than from her being sent back to prison.
The majority judgment is reminiscent of a therapeutic jurisprudence outcome.
When delivering the minority judgment, Madala J considered the principles in the Zinn triad and then took the interests of the children into account to determine whether there was a justifiable reason to interfere with the sentence imposed by the high court. According to a report by the Department of Social Development, relatives of the children were prepared to take care of the children, as they did on previous occasions that M had been imprisoned. The report also stated that the children were not at risk of severe prejudice, should their mother be sent to prison. Madala J decided to retain the sentence of imprisonment. The rights of the children were therefore limited in favour of a sentence of direct imprisonment. 
Conclusion
The Zinn triad remains the basic measure to be used by sentencing courts to determine an appropriate sentence. However, it is no longer the case that children will only be treated merely as a circumstance of the offender or as a mitigating factor when considering an appropriate sentence. In fact, even though the court has a wide discretion to decide which factors should be allowed to influence the measure of punishment, in a case in which the offender is a primary caregiver, Section 28(2) must be included as an independent factor.
Should an appropriate sentence have already revealed itself, the sentencing officer is obliged to pay attention to the rights of the child stipulated in Section 28(1)(b).
However, if there is a range of sentences to be considered, the rights of the child must be placed on the scale as a separate factor to be weighed against the other factors. Section 28(2) therefore has the potential to have a direct influence on the outcome of the case. The judge will then determine an appropriate sentence. Should the sentencing court not adhere to the guidelines set by the Constitutional Court and not include the rights of the child as a factor to be considered when determining a sentence, it will be regarded as a misdirection. The court of review or appeal will then have to determine an adequate sentence by using the guidelines set by Sachs J. In this regard, the inclusion of Section 28(1)(b) and 28(2) has brought about a substantial change in the sentencing process. It is essential that the interests of children be considered when determining a sentence if the offender is the primary caregiver. Sachs J stated these sections should become a standard preoccupation of all sentencing courts in order to have proper regard for the constitutional requirements. 128 With reference to the case law discussed, it is justifiable to describe the effect of the Constitution on the South African legal system as revolutionary.
129
The inclusion of these sections in the sentencing process makes way for the possibility of a therapeutic outcome. The application of Section 28(2) can have the effect that a custodial sentence is changed to a non-custodial sentence, which would ultimately be to the advantage of the children of the offender. If the appropriate sentence is direct imprisonment, Section 28(1)(b) obliges the state to ensure that the children will receive appropriate alternative care. The application of the second part of Section 28(1)(b) can be utilised to apply the law in a more therapeutic way, as was the case in Kika and Howells. However, it is also possible that, after due consideration of Section 28(1)(b), the court will come to a decision without paying any attention to the human, emotional and psychological side of the legal process.
130
The process will have a legal outcome, but the judge will not search for ways to minimise the negative effects on the well-being of those affected by the law. 131 Even though Madala J considered these sections, his application of the law without considering the possible negative consequences made the result anti-therapeutic.
Thus, it cannot be concluded that the inclusion of children's rights during the sentencing process will always result in a therapeutic outcome. However, when a judge applies these sections, it can be an opportunity to create therapeutic results.
Sachs J stated, "proper regard for constitutional requirements necessitates a degree of change in judicial mindset".
By including the rights of the child as part of the sentencing process, the process was developed and might in future be conducted in such a manner that all the individuals involved in a particular incident will be considered and protected. 132 Du
Plessis and Sinclair 133 claim that when one considers the different applicable fundamental rights, the application of a therapeutic jurisprudence approach and the protection of these rights may be viewed as mutually supportive. 
